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Strategies for Simplifying the Medicare Advantage Market 
By 
Marsha Gold1 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In 2009, Medicare offers beneficiaries the option to enroll at least seven different types of 
Medicare Advantage (MA) plans: Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Provider 
Sponsored Organizations (PSOs), local Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), regional 
PPOs, Private Fee-For-Service Plans (PFFS), Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs), and 
Special Needs Plans (SNPs). In terms of the quantity, in 2009, half of all Medicare 
beneficiaries have at least 41 plan choices (excluding SNPs available only to qualifying 
subgroups) not including an extensive array of Medicare stand-alone prescription drugs also 
offered.  
 
Nationwide, 283 distinct firms have some form of MA or other prepaid comprehensive 
contract with Medicare. But while many firms participate in the MA market, offering multiple 
products, often within the same community, enrollment is heavily concentrated in a few 
firms, both nationally and in local markets. This situation makes it more likely that the MA 
choices offered beneficiaries can be streamlined without extensive disruption for current 
enrollees. 
 
Existing research suggests that simplification may have advantages for beneficiaries. 
Traditional microeconomic theory holds that choice is good for markets and beneficiaries. 
The theory posits that market competition is a driving force for innovation and efficiency; 
such competition provides benefits by having many competitors, none of whom dominates. 
Broad choice also makes it easier for beneficiaries to find options that best meet their 
individual medical needs, economic circumstances, and personal preferences. There are 
downsides to choice and competition, however. With more choice, there is less ability to 
achieve economies of scale, either within firms or overall in Medicare, and potentially more 
chances for competitors to “game” the system through product design. Such outcomes 
would make it harder to achieve overall goals of the Medicare program. Further, emerging 
empirical research in the areas of psychology and behavioral economics shows that, while 
consumers say they prefer having many choices, they do not necessarily respond well to 
such multiple options.  
 
This Issue Brief considers the case for simplifying beneficiary plan choices in the Medicare 
Advantage program and analyzes implications of potential options on plan availability and 
current enrollees. The analysis is based on plans offered in the individual market to all 
beneficiaries.  
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Options for Simplification 
The first set of options would require a minimum enrollment for Medicare Advantage plans 
offered to beneficiaries, and the second set would limit the types of Medicare Advantage 
plans that would be offered. The analysis assesses the effects of these options on plan 
availability and beneficiaries.  
 
Minimum Enrollments and Related Policies. Because current MA enrollment is highly 
concentrated by plan and firm, there are some relatively simple ways in which CMS could 
streamline the number of choices provided to beneficiaries while limiting the effects on 
current enrollees (see Table ES-1).  
• Options 1 and 2:  Eliminate Small or Duplicative Plans as Recommended in 
the 2010 CMS Call Letter. Eliminating plans with 10 or fewer enrollees, and 
limiting the number of MA-PDs per contract per MSA, would remove more than a 
third of all individual non-SNP plans (963) but affect relatively small numbers of 
enrollees and leave beneficiaries with an average of 33 choices each (versus the 
current mean of  43). 
• Options 3 and 4:  Go Further In Eliminating Low-Enrollment Plans. Raising 
the minimum plan enrollment threshold to 100 would approximately double the 
number of plans eliminated with very little impact on current enrollees, since few 
are in plans with 11–99 enrollees. Applying this enrollment threshold at the 
contract level, rather than the plan level, would affect few additional enrollees but 
lower the administrative burden on CMS. 
• Options 5 and 6:  Require Firms to Reach a Minimum Market Threshold. 
Requiring that firms in urban areas reach a minimum enrollment of 1,500, or 5 
percent market share, in each MSA in which they operate would reduce the 
number of plans offered by more than half but affect fewer than 10 percent of 
current enrollees, and leave beneficiaries with an average of 22 plans available 
to them (15, if all of the previously discussed options also were enacted).   
Streamline Authorized Plan Types. Another approach would be to reduce the number of 
Medicare Advantage plan types offered under the Medicare Advantage program – 
eliminating plan types that do not appear to be necessary. Such actions would not 
necessarily reduce the number of plans offered because firms offering them could decide to 
replace them with plans under remaining contract types. However, their elimination would 
reduce the number of distinctions beneficiaries have to make, thus reducing the complexity 
of choice. (The analysis for these options assumes that the eliminated plans would leave 
the Medicare Advantage market and not be replaced with other types of plans; it thus 
reflects the upper bound for the option’s effects.) 
• Option 7:  Eliminate PSOs. Eliminating the provider-sponsored option (PSO) 
would have little effect on the number of plans offered even if all PSOs available 
in 2009 withdrew from Medicare Advantage and did not convert to either Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) or Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs). 
While initiated to encourage providers to offer plans outside the usual state 
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licensure requirements, there are only seven PSOs nationwide in 2009, and 
structurally they seem fairly similar to current HMOs and PPOs. 
 
• Option 8:  Eliminate Regional PPOs (RPPOs). Originally intended as a vehicle 
to expand choice in rural areas, regional PPO plans are available to more than 
90 percent of beneficiaries, but have relatively low enrollment. Firms have 
indicated that these plans have difficulty competing against local coordinated 
care plans, with payments and benefits established on a county-by-county basis. 
PFFS plans, combined with selected local coordinated care plan offerings, have 
evolved to fulfill the role originally intended for RPPOs. The rationale for keeping 
two types of plans for this purpose may no longer exist, assuming that Congress 
keeps current network PFFS requirements, as authorized by the Medicare 
Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 [MIPPA]. 
 
• Option 9:  Require Network PFFS Plans to Become Coordinated Care 
Contracts. In 2011, PFFS plans in most areas of the country will be required to 
form networks (except in counties with two or fewer other kinds of plans). The 
utility of separate network-based PFFS authority may be obsolete to the extent 
they are expected to be like coordinated care plans and could be authorized 
under that authority.  The analysis makes the assumption that those PFFS plans 
subject to the network requirement would withdraw from the Medicare Advantage 
market and not be replaced with new plans of different types because their 
sponsors already had such plans approved or because they did not choose to 
offer them.. 
 
 
Standardize Plan Features. In addition to these steps, MA also could be simplified through 
standardization of benefits so that beneficiaries do not have to analyze as many 
distinctions. This could involve standardized service areas, benefits, and labels, as well as 
more consistent requirements under Part D for PFFS and coordinated care plans. While 
these options do not change the number of plan choices, they could increase the quality 
and clarity and make it easier for beneficiaries to choose. These actions might build on 
CMS’s ongoing efforts to make plan labeling more consistent and clarify out of pocket costs 
for beneficiaries (see 2010 Call Letter). 
CONCLUSIONS     
Medicare Advantage has evolved into a program that gives beneficiaries many and 
more complex choices than virtually all other public or private health insurance programs 
(KFF/HRET 2008). Despite the proliferation of choice, diverse plan options, and many 
competitors, enrollment is concentrated disproportionately among a limited number of 
firms, contracts, and plans. Our analysis shows that eliminating low-enrollment plans, as 
CMS has proposed, would affect a relatively small number of beneficiaries. Even with 
these changes (Options 1 and 2), beneficiaries could continue to have many plan 
choices available, raising  a more basic question for policymakers is whether the MA 
program warrants a more fundamental redesign to better serve its beneficiaries in the 
long term. 
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Table ES.1. Estimated Effects of Policy Options to Simplify Medicare Advantage Choices for 
Beneficiaries on Plan Availability and Enrollees, based on 2009 Enrollment (excluding group 
plans and SNPs) 
Number of Plans Available 
per Beneficiary 
Option Number of Plans 
Affected 
Number of  
Plans 
Unaffected
Number of 
Enrollees 
Affected 
Percent of 
Medicare 
Advantage 
Enrollees  
Affected 
Mean Median 
Current Program 2009   -- 2,735 -- --      43        41        
CMS Call Letter 2010 Changes       
1.   Require plans to have minimum 
number of enrollees – more than 10  
461 2,274 291,065a 3.9% 37 35 
2.   Limit contracts to no more than two  
MA-PDs per MSA  
639 2,096 315,741 4.3% 38 37 
Combined Effect of #1 and #2 963 1,772 606,806 8.2% 33 32 
Other Options to Eliminate Low-
Enrollment Plans 
      
3.   Require plans to have minimum 
number of enrollees – 100 or more  
923 1,812 311,377 4.2% 32 31 
4.   Require at least 100 enrollees per 
contract  
184 2,551 1,649 0.0% 40 39 
5.   Contract with firms that have a 
minimum of  1,500 individual  
enrollees nationwide     
109 2,626 20,312 0.3% 42 40 
6.   In urban areas, allow firms to contract 
only if they have at least 5 percent 
market share or more  than 1,500 
enrollees 
1,556 1,179 654,229 8.8% 22 22 
Combined Effect of Options #3-6 1,912 823 962,867 13.0% 17 17 
Combined Effect of Options #1-6 2,054 681 1,247,996 16.9% 15 15 
Other Options to Streamline Plan  
Typesa 
    15 15 
7.  Eliminate PSOs 7 2,728 12,876 0.2% 43 41 
8.   Eliminate RPPOs 51 2,684 291,643 3.9% 41 40 
9.   Require Network PFFS to Become 
Coordinated Care Contracts 
688 2,040 1,514,050 20.5% 19 15 
Combined Effect of Options 7-9 746 2,047 1,818,569 24.9% 16 13 
Combined Effect of All Options  2,094 641 2,539,223 34.3%     8 7 
Source: MPR analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) using CMS’s county-contract-plan file for March 2009 
Note:  In March 2009, there were 7,106,326 enrollees reported as in plans serving the individual market (excluding SNPs). Since 
CMS does not report enrollment for plans with 10 or fewer enrollees; the number of enrollees cited as affected by cutting 
such plans is an estimate based on the difference between the total numbers of individual non-SNP MA enrollees 
nationally in March 2009 (7,397,421) and the cumulative number of such enrollees in reported plans (7,106,356). 
a 
If these changes were made, some firms might substitute alternative contracts in some areas, adding to the total number of plans. Option 
#9 shows all current PFFS plans affected by network requirements already in place because of MIPPA.   
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Strategies for Simplifying the Medicare Advantage Market 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Issue Brief, we analyze diverse options for simplifying choice in the Medicare 
Advantage (MA) program. The brief responds to concerns expressed by the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and others that the large number of choices 
currently provided to Medicare beneficiaries may be detrimental to effective choice and 
generate other problems for the Medicare program and industry (e.g., discriminatory 
practices, financial instability among small-volume offerors, and reduced economies of 
scale for MA firms). CMS’s 2010 MA Call Letter encourages one option for simplifying 
choice for Medicare beneficiaries—eliminating plans offered under contracts that have 
very few enrollees or that are virtually indistinguishable from others offered to 
beneficiaries under the same contract.2 The issue of simplification and how to achieve it 
warrants broader consideration, however. 
Our core analysis is organized in two parts. The first, which is largely theoretical, 
synthesizes the arguments for and against simplification as reflected in the literature on 
consumer choice and competition theory. The second, which is empirically based, first 
examines the current structure of MA choice in 2009 as defined by MA sponsors, 
contracts, and plans, and then analyzes the effect of specific options for simplifying the 
market. We conclude by summarizing the implications of our analysis for MA policy.  
 
PART I: THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
 
THE ORIGINS OF MA COMPLEXITY 
 
Medicare, at its inception, was designed as a program that delivered benefits through a 
single public plan, but over time, has evolved into a much more complex program. 
Today, the plan choices available to Medicare beneficiaries are numerous and diverse. 
In 1982, Congress for the first time gave beneficiaries the option to enroll in private 
plans by authorizing enrollment in Medicare HMOs (effective in 1985). In 1997, 
Congress broadened the authorized private plan options to include other forms of 
coordinated care, particularly Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), Provider 
Sponsored Organizations (PSOs) as well as private fee-for-service option (PFFS) and a 
time-limited demonstration of Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs). The Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) further expanded the types of MA plans,  authorizing 
new regional PPO and special needs (SNP) plans, redesigned MSAs, and enhanced 
federal MA payments to stabilize the existing market and encourage firms to participate 
(Gold 2006). Today, most Medicare beneficiaries have a choice of at least five different 
types of Medicare Advantage plans, not to mention stand-alone prescription drug plans 
                                                 
2 CMS 2009. The provisions cited are discussed on pp. 11–12 of the Call Letter. 
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(PDPs). In terms of the number of choices, on average Medicare beneficiaries in 2009 
can choose from among 43 Medicare Advantage plans; they also have at least 45 
prescription drug plans (Hargrave et al. 2009).  
 
The evolution of the Medicare marketplace raises fundamental questions about whether 
the number and diversity of options is well-suited to meet the needs of the beneficiary 
population. Those who want to stay with traditional Medicare for Parts A and B but want 
the prescription drug benefit (Part D) need to choose a freestanding prescription drug 
plan (PDP). In 2009, there were 16 nationwide sponsors of such plans, with other firms 
offering products in one or more regions (aggregations of one or more states) so that all 
beneficiaries now have at least 45 PDPs from which to choose (KFF 2008). The 
alternative is to choose an MA plan that integrates coverage for Parts A and B (with a 
so-called “Part C” plan), along with Part D and selected supplemental benefits. In most 
instances, beneficiaries also can now select between MA plans that incorporate a 
prescription drug benefit (MA-PD) and those that do not (MA-only). 
 
 
THE VALUE OF CHOICE FROM THE CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE 
 
Traditional microeconomic theory holds that choice maximizes utility and allows other 
important goals to be achieved by promoting competition and allowing people’s diverse 
preferences to be matched in the marketplace. Such a theory suggests that more 
choice is better. The conviction that social welfare is enhanced by the provision and 
exercise of choice strongly influences public policy in the United States (Botti and 
Iyengar 2006). 
 
Research emerging from psychology and behavioral economics confirms that 
consumers say they want choice but also that they experience problems in handling it. 
When consumers are confronted with many choices, they are less likely to make a 
decision than when they have few (Iyengar and Lepper 2000). When they do make a 
choice, those with many choices express more dissatisfaction and regret. Consumers 
have cognitive difficulty in distinguishing between multiple choices and, counter to 
traditional theory, often do not know their preferences in advance. Because decisions 
made in this context also generate negative emotions, some argue that consumers 
would be better off by narrowing the choice set and emphasizing only high-value 
choices (Botti and Iyengar 2006).  
 
For the past several years, researchers have examined how these considerations on 
choice apply to health insurance, particularly among the elderly, who have been 
provided with an increased array of choices through the MMA.3 “Bounded rationality” (a 
term defined by Herbert Simon) exists, say Hanoch and Rice (2006), because people 
have “restricted information-processing capabilities, inexpert computational abilities, 
incomplete knowledge of the world, and limited time for making decisions.” Such 
dynamics are particularly relevant for the elderly because of the increased risk of 
                                                 
3 See especially Hanoch and Rice (2006).  
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cognitive impairment among the elderly and the mechanisms they use to compensate 
for changes in cognitive function.   
 
Research has shown that such processes influence the choice of health insurance 
among Medicare beneficiaries. Beneficiaries were more satisfied after Medigap 
standardization simplified the types of choices available to them to supplement their 
Medicare benefits (Fox et al. 2003; McCormack et al. 1996). In the 2004–2005 period, 
most beneficiaries did not choose a drug discount card, despite being offered numerous 
options, because they did not understand the choices and had difficulty in accessing 
information (KFF 2004). Increasing the choice set in Medicare private plans from 1–2 to 
3–4 increased the probability of enrolling, but further expansion in choice resulted in no 
greater willingness to enroll and, in many cases, less (Elbel and Schlesinger 2009a). In 
a nationally representative experiment conducted among those ages 65 and over, 
individuals provided with structured choices between a designated health plan and 
alternatives did not respond in predicted ways (Elbel and Schlesinger 2009b). Rather, 
they showed “status quo” bias and were swayed by the way options were ordered. They 
also experienced increased difficulty with eight or more options, a fact the authors 
attribute both to preference uncertainty and cognitive overload. The findings persisted 
even when choice was reconfigured to create “dominated options,” in which one option 
dominates the others presented. Likewise, early analysis of prescription drug plan 
choice under the MMA shows that, contrary to expectations, beneficiaries do not 
necessarily choose plans that could yield lower out-of-pocket costs (Gruber 2009).   
 
In sum, while consumers express interest in choice and economists view choice as 
enhancing value, the empirical evidence shows that individuals faced with a large 
number of alternatives often avoid choice or choose options that may be inconsistent 
with their preferences, and afterward feel negative about the experience. There is thus 
strong empirical support for policymakers to consider ways of streamlining and 
improving the number and quality of available MA options. 
CHOICE WITHIN A COMPETITIVE MARKET FRAMEWORK 
Choice also is positively regarded because of its role in competitive markets; economic 
theory holds the role of choice as central to the drive toward innovation and efficiency. 
As White (2007) summarizes: 
Markets should maximize value because as suppliers pursue profit and 
investment in creating capacity in pursuit of profit, they will be disciplined 
by customers’ shopping. The need to offer lower prices than the 
competition’s should encourage efficiency, and the drive to satisfy 
customers should encourage the creation of a diversity of products to 
match different individual utilities. 
Few believe that current health care markets function optimally. Rather, the debate 
centers on whether markets ultimately can perform optimally, and whether they 
should—that is, the debate revolves around the relative merits of making markets work 
by removing regulatory barriers to competition versus regulating markets more or even 
replacing them, at least in part, to achieve public policy goals (Nichols et al. 2004; Butler 
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2004; Cogan et al. 2005; Marmor and Bradshaw 2006). Policymakers differ in their 
perspectives on these issues; the Republican Party generally favors competition, 
encouraging it with MA and the design of Part D through the MMA. Democrats tend to 
have more reservations; with the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act 
of 2008 (MIPPA), they sought to constrain competition (Iglehart 2004, 2008). Such 
ideological disagreements cannot be resolved empirically.  
 
Beyond ideology, choice has important operational implications for markets and 
program administration. Antitrust theory is built around the concept that a sufficient 
number of firms need to participate in a market to support competition. Restrictions on 
choice that adversely affect competition thus raise concerns. But such restrictions also 
have potential positive effects. With a limited workforce for program administration, 
CMS may be able to do a better job of overseeing the industry with fewer participants 
and fewer plans to be approved or monitored. Limiting firm offerings also could mean 
they may be less able to structure benefits so as to attract more “profitable” (usually 
healthier) enrollees—however firms may define such enrollees based on the methods in 
place to set payment rates and then adjust for risk. Fewer sponsors also could result in 
larger enrollments, possibly leading to economies of scale, reduced administrative 
costs, and lower financial risk of firm failure. 
 
The effect of program change on competition historically has been a political as well as 
administrative issue, to the extent that such arguments are used by industry to oppose 
unwelcome regulatory changes. Such arguments were made about standardizing 
Medigap benefits, although analysts have found mostly positive effects from 
standardization—but also no evidence of cost savings (Fox et al. 2004; Rice et al. 1997).  
 
Even though the interpretation of whether reduced choice is positive or negative tends 
to be controversial, it is important to consider how simplification of the market might 
affect the number of firms participating, market concentration, and the ability of 
regulators to monitor offerings.  
 
PART II: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Our analysis of the current MA market and how it would be affected by various options 
for simplification is based on analysis of public data on 2009 MA offerings and 
enrollment. While we focus mainly on options possible under CMS’s current authority, 
we include some options that appear to require new legislation (see Appendix, Methods 
and Data Sources.) 
 
 
CURRENT MA INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND CONCENTRATION 
The MA market today can be perceived either as extremely competitive or not very 
competitive at all, depending upon how competition is defined. This variance stems in 
large part from the fact that many firms participate in this market—and there are many 
plans available to each beneficiary—but enrollment is concentrated in plans offered by 
relatively few firms. 
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Nationwide, 283 distinct parent organizations (referred to in this brief as “firms”) have 
some form of contract to sponsor an MA or other prepaid group plan. Ninety-nine 
percent of beneficiaries have a choice of plans from at least five firms, and 75 percent 
from 10 firms or more (Table 1). There are fewer firms sponsoring products that require 
the formation of networks (such as HMOs and PPOs). When we examine only local 
coordinated care plans, we find fewer beneficiaries with choices available from five firms 
or more, but 65 percent can choose from at least three firms (see Table 1 and Appendix 
Table A.1). Rural beneficiaries have fewer choices, reflecting the well-known difficulties 
of establishing coordinated care and provider networks in these areas.4  
 
Table 1. Percentage of Beneficiaries by Number of Firms Competing for the MA Business in 2009 
 Percent of Beneficiaries 
Locally 
Competing 
Firms 
Any Contract 
Type 
MA Contracts 
Only CCPs Only 
Local CCPs 
Onlya 
Local CCPs 
Only (excluding 
SNPs) 
Under 5 1% 1% 45% 51% 58%a 
5–9 24 30 38 32 24 
10–15 53 54 11 11 12 
16+ 22 16 6 6 5 
 
Source: MPR analysis of CMS data from the Contract-County file for March 2009. Excludes sponsors offering group-
only products. 
aIncludes 12 percent with no choice, 12 percent with one sponsor only, 11 percent with two choices, and 24 percent 
with three to four choices.  
 
 
While many firms participate in the individual MA market, national enrollment tends to 
be concentrated in a small number of firms (Figure 1). One in three individual enrollees 
is in a plan sponsored by either UnitedHealthcare (18 percent) or Humana (15 percent). 
These and nine other national firms account for more than half of all enrollment. Another 
16 percent of enrollees are with firms that are independently owned but BCBS affiliated. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 While 98 percent of rural beneficiaries have 5 or more sponsor choices for any MA or similar 
prepaid plan, few have that many choices of coordinated care plans. When SNPs are excluded, 38 
percent of beneficiaries have no local CCP choice, 30 percent can choose from one sponsor only, 17 
percent from two, and 15 percent have choices among three or more (data not presented). When regional 
PPOs are considered, 97 percent of rural beneficiaries have some choice (up from 62 percent without 
PPOs)—33 percent can choose from one sponsor, 35 percent from two, and 30 percent from among 
three or more (data not presented). 
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 Figure 1. Distribution of Individual MA Enrollment by Firm or Affiliate, 2009 
13.4%
8.6%
2.6%
1.6%
0.8%
17.3%
16.0%
4.3%
3.8%
1.9%
2.4%
1.0%a
26.2%
Blue Cross Blue Shield Affiliate
UnitedHealthcare
Humana
Kaiser Permanente
Coventry
Aetna
HealthNet
Universal American
WellCare
Health Spring
WellPoint (Non Blues)
Sterling
Other
 
Source: MPR analysis of CMS’s Contract-County file for March 2009 
Note:  Excludes group and SNP enrollees; only enrollees in plans authorized under MA are included (excludes 
cost, HCPP, PACE and demonstration plans).   
aWellPoint has 4 percent market share including the firm’s BC-BS affiliates. (BC-BS has 14.3 percent without 
WellPoint enrollees.) 
 
 
Despite the large number of firms, competition in most markets tends to be limited to a 
smaller number of dominant firms. In almost two-thirds of the MSAs, the three firms in 
the MSA with the highest enrollment account for more than 75 percent of all enrollment 
in that area (Figure 2). The most common metric used by regulators to assess the 
adequacy of competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which serves as the 
foundation for federal antitrust merger guidelines.5 Looking at the health insurance 
industry generally,6 the HHI is above 1,800 (a marker of concentration) in all but 15 of 
the largest 100 markets (Appendix Table A-2). The same is true in all but 36 of the 361 
MSAs (see Appendix Table A.3). 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 This index is constructed by summing the squares of the market share of individual competitors in 
the market to assess their “concentration.” The HHI is used as a screen for assessing proposed mergers. 
Markets with an HHI above 1,800 are viewed as “highly concentrated.” See Hyman and Kovacic (2004). 
6 Robinson (2004) argues that, as a result of consolidation, competition actually is limited. However, 
others challenge his use of states to define markets and point out that the HHI is better suited for 
screening than for diagnosing market competition (Hyman and Kovacic 2004). 
Individual (non-SNP) enrollment=7.3 million 
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Figure 2. Distribution of MSAs by Percent Enrollment in Top 3 Firms, 2009 
1%
32%
43%
24%
Under 50
50-75
76-90
Over 90
Share of Enrollment 
Top Three Firms
 
Source: MPR analysis of CMS data, 2009. 
Note:  The top three firms are selected separately in each MSA. 
 
While these findings do not mean that competition is absent, they do indicate that a few 
firms are likely to define the terms of competition. That is, in most urban markets, a few 
firms dominate and competition is mainly among these firms or between them and the 
traditional Medicare program. Because of this circumstance, it may be possible to 
reduce the number of choices without having a major effect on market competition. 
 
Choices Available to Beneficiaries in 2009. While some aspects of the Medicare 
market are national in scope, competition tends to be local; firms compete for business 
in different communities with an array of products they believe will be both attractive to 
beneficiaries and financially feasible, given current MA payment structures. With the 
exception of regional PPOs, service areas under a contract are set by county and 
benefits are tailored to payment rates that also vary on a county basis.  
 
At the local market level, beneficiaries have many available choices. Excluding groups 
and SNP plans, there were 2,735 plans offered under MA in 2009. Virtually all 
beneficiaries had at least 16 plans available to them and almost two-thirds had 40 or 
more (see Figure 3 and Appendix Table A.4).  
 
 
n = 361 MSAs 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Beneficiaries by Number of Individual MA Plans Available, 2009 
1%
16%
28%
25%
14%
16%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
0-15
16-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60+
Source: MPR analysis of CMS data. 
Note: Excludes SNP and group plans. 
 
The extensiveness of choice in MA reflects a combination of (1) the types of plans 
authorized in MA; (2) the number of firms competing in markets to enroll individuals in 
these diverse products (i.e., the number of unique contracts for each plan type per 
market); and (3) the diversity of the number of benefit packages (i.e., the number of total 
plans available per market). 
 
Available Plan Types. Most employers that offer health insurance offer their 
employees a limited choice of health plans, if they offer a choice at all. In contrast, 
Medicare offers beneficiaries at least seven MA plan types: HMO, PPO, PSO, Regional 
PPO, PSO, MSA, and PFFS, along with three non-MA options authorized separately 
(cost, HCPP, PACE) (see Table A-5). In contrast, 85 percent of firms offering health 
benefits (with 49 percent of covered workers) use a single plan type (KFF/HRET 2008). 
Our analysis shows that virtually all beneficiaries have at least one PFFS choice, 91 
percent a regional PPO choice, 82 an HMO choice, 69 percent a local PPO (or PSO) 
choice, and 68 percent an MSA choice (Table A-6). As a result, two-thirds of 
beneficiaries are asked to choose from among at least one contract for each of five plan 
types, even on this streamlined basis. Some of the distinctions across these plans may 
be more relevant than others to beneficiaries. For example, the distinction between a 
PSO and other coordinated care plans (HMO or PPO) rests mainly in the sponsor and 
the likely regulatory situation. Each plan type, except the point-of-service HMO (HMO-
POS), involves a separate CMS contract and separate approval of each plan offered in 
the contract’s service area. Offering more plan types thus adds both to the complexity of 
beneficiaries’ decision making and the administrative burden on CMS.  
 
N
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Percentage of Beneficiaries 
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Contracts. Under MA, CMS contracts with firms to offer specific plan types in given 
geographical areas (Figure 4). In 2009, there were 538 MA contracts, although 92 
percent of enrollees were in only one-third (178) of these (see Table A.6). CMS 
authorizes particular firms to offer products at the contract level, with the firms having to 
meet defined specified organizational, network, and other standards for the product and 
for the collection and reporting of certain data (e.g., CAHPS), which are mostly contract 
specific.  
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of Beneficiaries by Number and Type of Contracts Available, 2009  
 
Source: MPR analysis of CMS data. 
Note:  Number of contracts excludes SNP and group-only contracts. 
a<0.5 percent. 
 
OPTIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION 
In theory, it is possible to simplify choice within the MA market in two ways. First, limit the 
number of choices available to beneficiaries. Second, improve the clarity or quality of those 
choices through standardization. In practice, these two options are not entirely distinct and can be 
combined. We review here the effects of various options for simplifying the MA market, 
focusing first on those whose major effect is to limit the number of choices available, second on 
options that streamline the types of choices authorized, and finally on options to standardize the 
way choices are presented to better support beneficiaries considering choice. Table 2 summarizes 
the effect of the first two types of options on the number of plans available to beneficiaries and 
current enrollees. 
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Table 2. Estimated Effects of Policy Options to Simplify Medicare Advantage Choices for Beneficiaries on 
Plan Availability and Enrollees, based on 2009 Enrollment (excluding group plans and  SNPs) 
Number of Plans 
Available per 
Beneficiary Option 
Number 
of Plans 
Affected 
Number of  
Plans 
Unaffected
Number of 
Enrollees 
Affected 
Percent of 
Medicare 
Advantage 
Enrollees  
Affected Mean Median 
Current Program 2009a -- 2,735 -- -- 43    41       
CMS Call Letter 2010 Changes      
1.   Require plans to have minimum number of 
enrollees – more than 10  
461 2,274 291,065a 3.9% 37 35 
2.   Limit contracts to no more than two  MA-
PDs per MSAb  
639 2,096 315,741 4.3% 38 37 
Combined Effect of #1 and #2 963 1,772 606,806 8.2% 33 32 
Other Options to Eliminate Low-Enrollment 
Plans 
      
3.   Require plans to have minimum number of 
enrollees – 100 or more  
923 1,812 311,377 4.2% 32 31 
4.   Require at least 100 enrollees per 
contractc  
184 2,551 1,649 0.0% 40 39 
5.   Contract with firms that have a minimum of  
1,500 individual  enrollees nationwide     
109 2,626 20,312 0.3% 42 40 
6.   In urban areas, allow firms to contract only 
if they have at least 5 percent market share 
or more  than 1,500 enrollees 
1,556 1,179 654,229 8.8% 22 22 
Combined Effect of Options #3-6 1,912 823 962,867 13.0% 17 17 
Combined Effect of Options #1-6 2,054 681 1,247,996 16.9% 15 15 
Other Options to Streamline Plan  Typesd    15 15 
7.   Eliminate separate PSO authority 7 2,728 12,876 0.2% 43 41 
8.   Eliminate separate RPPO authority 51 2,684 291,643 3.9% 41 40 
9.   Require Network PFFS to Become 
Coordinated Care Contractse 
688 2,040 1,514,050 20.5% 19 15 
Combined Effect of Options 6-9 746 2,047 1,818,569 24.9% 16 13 
Combined Effect of All Options 2,094 641 2,539,223 34.3%     8 7 
 
Source:  MPR analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) using CMS’s county-contract-plan file for March 2009 
 
aIn March 2009, there were 7,106,326 enrollees reported as in plans serving the individual market (excluding SNPs). Since CMS does not report 
enrollment for plans with 10 or fewer enrollees; the number of enrollees cited as affected by cutting such plans is an estimate based on the 
difference between the total numbers of individual non-SNP MA enrollees nationally in March 2009 (7,397,421) and the cumulative number of such 
enrollees in reported plans (7,106,356). This number also is added to the count of 21,046 enrollees in plans with enrollment of 11-99 option 3). 
Calculation of the percentage of MA enrollees affected by individual options uses the higher national number without exclusions.  
bAssumes no more than two MA-PDs in an MSA per contract, with the reductions occurring in the lowest enrollment plans. The entire plan is 
dropped if 50 percent or more of plan enrollment is removed by the MSA restriction.  
cCMS does not report enrollment for contracts with fewer than 10 enrollees. These figures show only the reported enrollment. At most, the excluded 
enrollment is equal to that estimated in Option 1 but probably is less. 
dIf these changes were made, some firms might substitute alternative contracts in some areas, adding to the total number of plans.  
eIncludes all PFFS plans affected by network requirements according to final CMS 2010 Call Letter. 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ManagedCareMarketing/Downloads/MIPPA_Imp_memo091208Final.pdf., accessed June 2, 2009  
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Eliminate Certain Plans as Called for in the 2010 Call Letter. In its 2010 MA Call 
Letter, CMS strongly urges firms to streamline their plan offerings by eliminating plans 
that have 10 or fewer enrollees and those that differ little in their design from similar 
plans offered to the same beneficiaries.7  
 
In 2009, there were 461 individual MA, non-SNP plans with 10 or fewer enrollees. (See 
Figure 4, Table A.7, and Table A.8.) If these plans were eliminated, beneficiaries would 
have an average of 38 plan choices (versus 43 now). If firms were limited to no more 
than 2 MA-PDs in an MSA in each contract they held, 639 plans could be eliminated 
while still leaving an average of 38 plans per beneficiary. Together, these options would 
remove more than a third of all plans (963) but affect relatively small numbers of 
enrollees, while leaving beneficiaries with an average of 33 choices each.  
 
 
OTHER WAYS TO ELIMINATE LOW-ENROLLMENT PLANS 
 
Since CMS is considering minimum enrollment thresholds, there are other options it 
might want to consider. 
 
Minimum Plan Enrollment Threshold. Raising the threshold of minimum enrollment to 
100 would approximately double the number of plans eliminated while having very little 
impact on enrollees, since few people are in plans with 11–99 enrollees. Eliminating 
these plans would simplify beneficiary choice and reduce CMS administrative burden 
while leaving beneficiaries with an average of 40 choices. 
 
Minimum Contract Enrollment Threshold. Another option is to calculate minimums 
on the basis of contracts rather than plans. Nationwide, 34 percent of contracts (53) 
have 100 or fewer enrollees, with about half having 10 or fewer (see Figure 5 and Table 
A-9). Because few if any beneficiaries have selected these contracts, there would be 
minimal losses to beneficiaries or the industry in eliminating them. Steps that lower the 
number of contracts reduce the need for review and lessen other demands on CMS. 
Fewer contracts also will generate fewer plans, which in turn will reduce the demands 
on CMS’s actuarial staff to review bids and benefit packages and the burden of choice 
for beneficiaries.   
 
Minimum Firm Enrollment Threshold. CMS also could require competing firms to 
reach a minimum enrollment threshold to continue their participation. Under CMS 
regulation 42 CFR 422.514, organizations are required to achieve a minimum 
                                                 
7 CMS has indicated that it will review carefully all plans that carry 10 or fewer enrollees over a three-
year period or longer. CMS also has offered certain incentives to encourage integration—namely, an 
automatic transfer under certain circumstances of beneficiaries from one plan to another available from 
the same sponsor (e.g., similar benefits, premiums, or network requirements). Since enrollment tends to 
be concentrated in large firms, and these firms also tend to offer multiple products (contracts) with 
multiple benefit packages (plans), this could be feasible in many areas of the country. 
12
 
enrollment of 5,000 (only 1,500 in rural areas or if it is a PSO). It is not clear whether the 
requirement applies at the firm or contract level. Eliminating any firm with a total 
enrollment of 1,500 across its contracts would eliminate 36 firms but would leave 
beneficiaries with almost the same number of plans on average (42 versus 43). The 
effect on choice is greater if minimums are applied at the local market level, at least in 
urban areas. Establishing a firm minimum of 1,500 enrollees, or 5 percent of enrollment 
to maintain the firm’s presence in that market would eliminate 56 percent of plans 
(1,556) but affect fewer than 10 percent of current enrollees (0.6 million). Of all of the 
options considered so far, this one would go furthest in simplifying the market, although 
it also would affect more beneficiaries. However, on average, beneficiaries would still 
have a choice of 22 plans—or 15, if all of the above options were adopted. Rural 
beneficiaries would not be directly affected because the restriction is limited to urban 
areas. 
 
Many purchasers limit the number of firms they use to provide health benefits plans 
through selective contracting so Medicare beneficiaries still will have substantially more 
choice than other payers offer even with the limitations just discussed. Because it is a 
public program, Medicare differs from private payers in being less likely, from a political 
point of view, to limit participation. However, Medicaid, which also is a state program, 
has limited the number of participating plans in some states (Kaye 2005). A program in 
which the plans bid competitively for the Medicare program, such as that mentioned in 
President Obama’s proposed budget, could provide a vehicle for selecting among 
competing sponsors; Medicare’s new reporting requirements might provide additional 
information to support such decision making (OMB 2009; CMS 2009a).  
Figure 5. Distribution of Plans by Type and Level of Enrollment, 2009  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MPR analysis of CMS data. 
Note: Excludes group and SNP-only contracts and like plans. 
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REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PLAN TYPES OFFERED 
 
Another way to limit choice is to revisit the current broad-based authority for multiple 
types of plans. Such change already is underway, in part in response to changes 
introduced in MIPPA.  
 
Eliminate PSOs. A relatively simple step would involve eliminating separate PSO 
authority under the assumption that it was not needed when HMO and PPO authority 
already exists..  PSOs were developed to encourage provider-based organizations to 
participate in MA by sidestepping certain state regulatory requirements for insurers. 
However, there are few distinct PSO contracts and in 2009, there are only seven PSO 
plans nationwide.  Eliminating PSOs as a distinct contract type could make it easier for 
beneficiaries to focus on the real differences in their access to providers across 
coordinated care plans, rather than their regulatory situation—e.g., who is in the 
network, what out-of-network coverage is provided, and what services require referral. 
 
Eliminate RPPOs. A third way to simplify the MA market is to eliminate the regional 
PPO option. Originally conceived as a way of encouraging coordinated care offerings on 
a more national basis, the regional PPO, with its larger service area and greater 
uniformity of benefits, largely has failed the marketplace test. Although RPPO options 
are available to more than 90 percent of beneficiaries nationwide (mainly because 
Humana offers them in 14 of the 26 regions), their enrollment remains small and lags 
behind that of local PPOs (328,000 versus 835,000 in individual plans in March 2009). 
Firms have told us that the regional PPO option typically is not viable in a market that 
establishes payment rates by county and also allows local plans to establish service 
areas and benefits by county, while requiring regional plans to offer standard products 
across broad regions (Gold 2008; Gold et al. 2008). Moreover, in some areas of the 
country, regional PPOs may be feasible only because CMS appears to have taken a 
less demanding stance in assessing network adequacy, particularly in certain rural 
areas. Regional PPOs appear to provide much more limited benefits than other plan 
types (Gold and Hudson 2009a, b).  
 
The case for regional PPOs is largely one of access to MA in rural areas, but PFFS 
authority also is meeting that need and has been a more popular product in the 
marketplace. While one can debate the relevance of MA choice in markets where 
coordinated care lacks traction, it is harder to make the case for maintaining two 
separate options for achieving this goal. Eliminating the RPPO option would have 
relatively little effect on the number of plans available, at least nationwide; fewer than 
300,000 enrollees would be affected. The key policy questions are (1) Do either PFFS 
or RPPO have an advantage over the other with respect to care management? (2) Is 
there is a net positive value in offering these alternatives to the regular program within 
Medicare in areas where local coordinated care plans are not able to make inroads? 
Among rural beneficiaries, 65 percent reside in areas with no local HMO option and 74 
percent in areas with no local PPO or PSO option (data not presented). In urban areas, 
the comparable numbers are 27 percent and 33 percent.  
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Require Network PFFS to Become Coordinated Care Contracts. With MIPPA requiring 
PFFS plans to have networks (except in counties with two or fewer other plans), it is not 
clear how these plans and coordinated care options will differ in the future in locales subject 
to this requirement. Based on CMS information about affected counties, we estimate that 
1.6 million PFFS enrollees are now in plans subject to this requirement; that is, 688 plans 
would have the majority of their enrollment subject to the requirement. If each of these plans 
withdrew from the market and did not substitute other offerings, the number of plans 
available to beneficiaries would decline from the current 43 to 18, with reductions 
concentrated in urban areas.  
 
In reality, firms likely will respond in different ways to MIPPA, with some substituting other 
offerings and others withdrawing entirely. This market is highly concentrated, with 85 
percent of PFFS enrollment nationwide in nine firms (Appendix Table A-10). Three of the 
nine dominant firms—Coventry, HealthNet, and WellCare—already have announced that 
they will withdraw from the PFFS market in 2010 in anticipation of the 2011 network 
requirements.8 A fourth, the market leader Humana, began in 2009 to shift PFFS enrollment 
toward coordinated care products in response to MIPPA, with PFFS seen as a declining 
share of its market (Oppenheimer 2009). Other firms, such as Universal American, are 
building networks in key markets so that they can maintain or even expand MA enrollment. 
They are likely to apply to offer new PPOs in at least some of these areas and actively 
compete for the PFFS business being dropped by other companies, using a combination of 
network and non-network plans.  
 
With MIPPA requiring networks for PFFS plans (unless there are few other alternatives 
available) and more consistent quality reporting across plan types, it is not clear whether 
there is or should be a distinction between network PFFS plans and coordinated care 
options. PFFS plans currently required to have networks could be required to contract as a 
coordinated care plan, eliminating potential beneficiary confusion over the difference 
between them and traditional Medicare, and simplifying the number of types of plans 
beneficiaries are asked to choose among. 
 
 
STANDARDIZATION AS A MEANS OF SIMPLIFYING CHOICE 
 
The options discussed previously deal with simplifying the complexity of choice based on the 
large number of alternatives that beneficiaries are asked to consider. Enhanced choice also 
can be achieved by standardizing the plans offered, either as a complement to plan 
simplification or on its own. There are several ways of standardizing plan options so that 
beneficiaries do not have to make as many distinctions among them and CMS has less 
administrative burden. Some forms of standardization also could increase the quality of 
choices available to beneficiaries. 
 
Standardize Service Areas for Benefits. Currently, firms can define plans in ways that 
vary benefit packages by county (except for regional PPOs). The rationale is that payment 
rates differ by county, which affects the financial feasibility of different benefit packages. 
                                                 
8 There could be some exceptions to allow firms to keep group contracts in place..  
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Requiring standardized service areas that coincide with accepted geographical units (e.g., 
MSAs, rural areas within states) could make it easier to develop standardized materials and 
other forms of communication to support beneficiary choice at the local level. Larger areas 
also could reduce beneficiary complaints about unequal benefits when two counties with 
different sets of plan benefits are included in the same media market (such as New York 
City and Nassau/Suffolk Counties in New York).9  
 
Standardize Benefits. Given what many view as the positive experience of standardizing 
Medigap benefits, there have been calls for a similar standardization of MA (O’Brien and 
Hoadley 2008; Fox et al. 1999). Because of the considerable diversity in today’s MA benefit 
structures (Gold and Hudson 2009), such standardization could be challenging, particularly if 
the aim is to avoid disruption. However, CMS could use information contained in the bids 
about actuarial values to assign plans to tiers, based on their characteristics or the 
generosity of their benefits. CMS also could standardize individual benefits. In another 
analysis, we have shown that most MA plans simplify Medicare’s benefit structure for Part 
A/Part B benefits (Gold and Hudson 2009b). Most plans eliminate Medicare’s inpatient 
hospital day limits and shift cost sharing toward copayments and away from deductibles and 
coinsurance. CMS could require that practices already in place throughout most of the 
industry be adopted by all, so that beneficiaries would know better which benefits are 
available to them.  
 
Standardize Plan Labels. Firms currently decide on the names of their plans, using them in 
unique ways that help to brand their products. In previous work, we have shown how the 
same names can be attached to different products within the same market and how that 
could result in confusion for beneficiaries (Gold 2009). CMS will begin to address this issue 
in 2010 by requiring that standardized plan type terminology be applied to the names of 
each plan (see Appendix A-5). However, while such labeling should clarify plan type, it will 
provide little guidance to beneficiaries seeking to assess the trade-offs between plans of the 
same type. In other markets, standardized benefits may be used to allow plans to be 
described as “gold,” “silver,” and “bronze.” Such standardized labels will be more difficult to 
apply in MA as long as benefits remain unstandardized. Using the bid data however, CMS 
could enhance labeling to better support beneficiary choice. For example, when firms offer 
two plans in the same market, one could be labeled “basic” and the other “enhanced,” based 
on their actuarial value. CMS also might apply bid data in other ways to enhance 
beneficiaries’ understanding of the actuarial value of plans and the protection this provides 
against both anticipated and unanticipated large expenses. 
 
Standardize Rules Across Plan Types on Part D Offerings. Increasingly, Congress is 
requiring that PFFS and coordinated care plans meet the same requirements. This 
standardization could be extended to rules about Part D offerings. Coordinated care plans 
are required to offer at least one MA-PD option; their enrollees who want Part D must 
purchase it from those plans. The MA-only option exists mainly to meet the preferences of 
enrollees who do not want Part D, either because they have other sources for these 
                                                 
9 However, borders exist whenever any distinctions are made across areas, so the issue of unequal 
treatment would remain, although the geography would change and differences might become less 
noticeable. 
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benefits, or for other reasons. PFFS plans originally were exempted from the requirement to 
offer a prescription drug plan because their capacity to do this was unclear. However, most 
firms in the PFFS market offer MA-PDs along with their MA plans, and the largest PFFS 
sponsors offer a nationwide PDP. They should thus be positioned to provide an MA-PD. 
Imposing a consistent Part D requirement would simplify choice for beneficiaries and also 
reduce the number of plans and the potential for gaming the system. PFFS plans account 
for 273 of the 700 MA-only plans offered (data not shown).10 Some firms are much more 
likely to emphasize MA-only PFFS plans than others.11 Standardizing rules across 
coordinated care plans and PFFS would level the playing field.
CONCLUSIONS
MA today has evolved into a complex program that gives beneficiaries a greater number of 
and more complex choices than virtually all other insurance programs. Despite the 
proliferation of choice, diverse plan options, and many competitors, enrollment in MA still is 
concentrated disproportionately in a limited number of firms, contracts, and plans. The issue 
for policymakers is what purpose is served by providing such an extensive set of choices. 
This is particularly true when there is evidence of at least as many adverse as positive 
effects on beneficiary choice, decision quality, and satisfaction with those choices. Managing 
choice is administratively burdensome for government, increases the risk of the industry 
gaming and discrimination, and adds to firm and Medicare costs by limiting savings from 
economies of scale. 
Our analysis shows that eliminating low-enrollment plans, as CMS has proposed, has some 
potential to simplify choice for beneficiaries. However, even if this occurs, the remaining MA 
market still would be very complicated. The types of contracts authorized in MA, and how 
their plans are presented to beneficiaries, drive the number contracts and plans to be 
reviewed. For this reason, actions that reduce contract types would better align Medicare 
with the structure of private plan choice and simplify decision making for beneficiaries. 
Standardizing the way plans are structured and presented to beneficiaries through 
standardized service areas, benefits, labels, and requirements could further increase the 
clarity and quality of choice for beneficiaries. 
10 Among MA-only PFFS plans, 36 percent have fewer than 10 enrollees and another 18 percent 
have between 11 and 99 enrollees. 
11 Among national firms, MA-PDs are least common for Wellcare (23 percent of 64 PFFS plans), 
HealthNet (32 percent of 62 PFFS plans), and Coventry (41 percent of 17 PFFS plans). In contrast, MA-
PDs make up 99 percent of market leader Humana’s 173 PFFS plans).  MA-PD offerings typically have 
been attractive to sponsors because they simplify beneficiary choice and can generate attractive benefit 
plans, since sponsors can use savings resulting from Part A/B payment rates to offset the costs of 
prescription drugs, whereas freestanding PDPs cannot. Freestanding PDPs do benefit, however, from the 
ability to share risk with the government, whereas MA-PDs do not.
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APPENDIX A 
METHODS AND ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
Methods and Data Sources 
This analysis focused on firms, the traditional unit of concern in monitoring a market’s competitiveness for 
purposes of antitrust enforcement. Operationally, we defined what constitutes a firm using the CMS’s data 
on “parent organization,” with some adjustments for common parent ownership or affiliation (e.g., Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield members). We supplemented our descriptive analysis with calculations employing 
the traditional Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), defining markets on the basis of standardized 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), for economic purposes, and nationally, because MA policy is set at 
the federal level. Firms also are relevant units of study because some features of MA may be set at the 
firm level, such as their general preferences with respect to network construction, provider payment, 
product design, quality improvement, and electronic infrastructure. 
 
Our analysis of the effects of various options for simplifying the MA market focused on the effects on 
choice for beneficiaries. Under the MMA, most MA choices are defined by aggregations of counties. For 
this reason, we examined the effects of options on choices available to beneficiaries based on their 
county of residence. In these analyses, we focused solely on options available to all beneficiaries in the 
individual market, excluding group and SNP plans. Group plans are not relevant because the choices 
offered beneficiaries are circumscribed by the group sponsor, usually the former employer of the retired 
beneficiary. Choice among SNPs is relevant, but we excluded it here because the SNP market is a 
specialized one, with plans available only to certain beneficiaries, and may warrant a separate analysis. 
(Most SNP enrollees currently are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid. The specialized nature of 
SNPs also means that most beneficiaries cannot enroll in them, so plan enrollments also tend to be 
smaller.) 
  
Our analysis used publicly available CMS data for March 2009, drawn from a number of files but primarily 
from a combination of the MA Contract-Plan-State-County file and the downloadable file of information on 
plans used to support Medicare Options Compare. The former provides information on the parent 
organization for each contract and plan and enrollment in each of the counties within its service area. The 
latter allows disaggregation of plans by counties, which have uniform benefits.    
 
The analysis is descriptive and cross-sectional and uses 2009 data to assess the effects of various policy 
options. Using 2009 data provides a picture of choice as it currently exists in the marketplace. By 2009, 
the MA market had stabilized after the major changes that came in 2006 with the implementation of Part 
D. The main limitation to the analysis is its static nature. However, modeling the long-term behavioral 
response by firms and beneficiaries to choice, although relevant, is complex and beyond the scope of this 
paper. This caveat is particularly relevant now, given potential changes in the market in 2010 and beyond 
as the industry responds to new requirements in MIPPA and reacts to potential payment reform in MA.  
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Table A.1. Percentage of Beneficiaries by Number of Sponsors Offering MA Plans by Type, 2009 
(excludes group-only contracts) 
   
Percentage of 
Beneficiaries  
 Excludes SNP-Only 
Contracts 
Number of 
Sponsors with 
Plans Available 
Any 
Contract 
Any MA 
Contract Any CCP 
Any Local 
CCP 
 
Any CCP  
Any Local 
CCP  
0 0.2% 0.2% 1.1% 10.5% 1.1% 11.5% 
1 0.0 0.0 6.2 10.9 10.0 12.3 
2 0.0 0.2 14.0 9.0 15.3 10.8 
3 0.2 0.1 13.3 10.6 15.3 15.0 
4 0.4 0.9 10.5 9.8 12.7 8.8 
5 1.1 1.7 15.7 13.0 12.5 8.2 
6 2.5 4.7 8.4 7.4 6.3 7.4 
7 6.1 5.1 5.4 6.4 6.6 4.9 
8 6.1 8.2 4.8 2.7 2.4 1.7 
9 8.6 10.5 3.8 2.9 3.4 3.3 
10 11.7 10.8 2.2 2.5 1.1 1.3 
11-15 41.4 41.8 8.8 8.4 9.5 9.3 
16-20 12.0 8.9 4.6 4.6 3.8 3.8 
20+ 9.5 6.9 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 
 
Source: MPR analysis of CMS’s Contract-County file for March 2009. 
 
Note:  Unique sponsors are identified based on parent affiliation. 
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Table A.2. Market Share Indicators of MA Market Concentration: HHI Based on All Enrollment, 
2009, Top 100 MSAs Ordered by MSA Rank in Total Population 
 
 All Enrollees 
MSA Name 
Percentage of  
Enrollment in Top 
Three Firmsa HHIb 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA2  59.5% 1,577 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA  70.2 2,031 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI  74.4 2,754 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE  88.3 3,340 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX  88.2 5,589 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL  68.6 3,105 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD  68.8 2,476 
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX  67.4 1,821 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI  95.8 5,270 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH  81.3 3,321 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA  62.3 1,510 
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA  89.8 5,026 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA  67.3 1,820 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ  67.3 1,961 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA  82.4 2,590 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI  75.6 2,723 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA  89.7 3,568 
St. Louis, MO-IL  80.6 2,484 
Baltimore-Towson, MD  78.3 2,439 
Pittsburgh, PA  90.3 3,846 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL  78.8 2,481 
Denver-Aurora, CO  92.0 3,919 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH  72.6 2,378 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN  78.2 2,259 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA  64.5 1,802 
Kansas City, MO-KS  93.4 4,103 
Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville, CA  91.3 4,336 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA  89.7 4,832 
San Antonio, TX  90.2 4,063 
Orlando, FL  79.3 2,590 
Columbus, OH  76.6 2,450 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA  88.7 3,701 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC  69.9 2,481 
Indianapolis, IN  51.5 1,345 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI  81.5 2,889 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV  95.5 4,730 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC  77.7 2,135 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA  99.3 4,849 
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Table A.2 (continued) 
 
 
 All Enrollees 
MSA Name 
Percentage of  
Enrollment in Top 
Three Firmsa HHIb 
Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro, TN  87.1 5,136 
Austin-Round Rock, TX  73.7 2,163 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR  67.8 1,791 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY  93.3 3,212 
Louisville, KY-IN  76.5 2,207 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT  75.9 2,640 
Jacksonville, FL  86.4 4,079 
Richmond, VA  65.5 2,194 
Oklahoma City, OK  88.1 3,244 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL  82.1 2,589 
Rochester, NY  96.6 5,388 
Salt Lake City, UT  71.6 1,889 
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT  88.5 6,064 
Honolulu, HI  86.2 3,412 
Tulsa, OK  80.9 4,095 
Dayton, OH  80.8 2,560 
Tucson, AZ  92.1 4,326 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY  79.9 2,961 
New Haven-Milford, CT  85.0 4,167 
Fresno, CA  82.2 3,211 
Raleigh-Cary, NC  79.8 2,704 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA  86.6 4,266 
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA  84.3 2,892 
Worcester, MA  91.8 4,442 
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI  86.4 4,188 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ  59.2 1,694 
Albuquerque, NM  94.7 4,249 
Baton Rouge, LA  94.1 4,888 
Akron, OH  74.9 2,240 
Springfield, MA  88.4 3,690 
El Paso, TX  70.1 1,962 
Bakersfield, CA  67.7 2,057 
Toledo, OH  84.6 3,521 
Syracuse, NY  71.7 1,985 
Columbia, SC  61.1 1,744 
Greensboro-High Point, NC  86.5 3,804 
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY  61.7 1,588 
Knoxville, TN  96.7 6,512 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR  67.5 1,672 
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA  70.4 2,258 
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Table A.2 (continued) 
 
 
 All Enrollees 
MSA Name 
Percentage of  
Enrollment in Top 
Three Firmsa HHIb 
Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL  67.2 1,697 
Wichita, KS  97.5 4,177 
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr, TX  88.6 2,998 
Stockton, CA  80.5 3,820 
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA  73.6 2,392 
Greenville, SC  50.0 1,461 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC  51.5 1,292 
Colorado Springs, CO  93.3 5,919 
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA  74.4 2,115 
Madison, WI  68.4 1,955 
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC  62.0 1,699 
Jackson, MS  79.2 2,562 
Portland-South Portland, ME  57.9 1,530 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL  62.1 1,634 
Des Moines, IA  84.6 2,546 
Chattanooga, TN-GA  77.9 2,192 
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL  89.3 5,090 
Lancaster, PA  52.1 1,329 
Boise City-Nampa, ID  85.4 3,786 
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA  96.4 7,641 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI  97.5 8,658 
Modesto, CA  93.7 4,622 
 
Source: MPR analysis of CMS data on enrollment by contract-plan-county, March 2009. 
 
Note: Includes enrollment in all MA plans in the group and individual market (including SNPs). 
 
aBased on the firms with the highest enrollment in that market, so the specific firms may differ across MSAs. 
 
bThe Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the standard index used in federal antitrust work. It is constructed by 
adding the squares of the market share of individual firms to assess the level of market concentration. Markets with 
an HHI above 1,800 are viewed as highly concentrated and subject to increased scouting. The maximum HHI is 
10,000. 
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Table A.3. Selected Indicators of MA Market Concentration: All MA Enrollees, 2009; All MSAs,   
Alphabetical by Name, 2009 
 
MSA Name 
Percentage of 
Enrollment in Top 
Three Firmsa HHIb 
Percentage 
of National 
Enrollment 
Abilene, TX  75.1% 2,658 0.023% 
Akron, OH  74.9 2,240 0.412 
Albany, GA  73.1 1,977 0.028 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY  80.0 2,961 0.484 
Albuquerque, NM  94.7 4,249 0.567 
Alexandria, LA  65.6 2,035 0.024 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ  59.2 1,694 0.310 
Altoona, PA  89.5 4,812 0.142 
Amarillo, TX  88.2 3,858 0.033 
Ames, IA  87.4 4,240 0.009 
Anchorage, AK  90.8 3,863 0.003 
Anderson, IN  73.9 2,253 0.027 
Anderson, SC  53.6 1,593 0.079 
Ann Arbor, MI  98.2 8,527 0.098 
Anniston-Oxford, AL  97.5 7,419 0.025 
Appleton, WI  82.5 2,590 0.152 
Asheville, NC  74.8 2,306 0.167 
Athens-Clarke County, GA  71.4 2,614 0.033 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA  62.3 1,510 0.987 
Atlantic City, NJ  94.4 6,227 0.043 
Auburn-Opelika, AL  91.7 3,650 0.019 
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC  62.0 1,699 0.141 
Austin-Round Rock, TX  73.7 2,163 0.155 
Bakersfield, CA  67.7 2,057 0.347 
Baltimore-Towson, MD  78.3 2,439 0.293 
Bangor, ME  76.0 2,298 0.032 
Barnstable Town, MA  90.5 3,988 0.061 
Baton Rouge, LA  94.1 4,888 0.367 
Battle Creek, MI  98.3 4,331 0.059 
Bay City, MI  97.8 8,149 0.035 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX  90.8 4,248 0.133 
Bellingham, WA  71.3 2,121 0.089 
Bend, OR  93.5 7,355 0.102 
Billings, MT  85.1 2,787 0.054 
Binghamton, NY  74.6 2,339 0.108 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL  82.1 2,589 0.760 
Bismarck, ND  97.1 3,959 0.014 
Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA  90.0 5,062 0.030 
Bloomington, IN  77.9 2,954 0.030 
Bloomington-Normal, IL  92.9 4,121 0.034 
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Table A.3 (continued) 
 
MSA Name 
Percentage of 
Enrollment in Top 
Three Firmsa HHIb 
Percentage 
of National 
Enrollment 
Boise City-Nampa, ID  85.4 3,786 0.330 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH  81.3 3,321 1.289 
Boulder, CO  94.8 4,782 0.105 
Bowling Green, KY  89.9 4,259 0.024 
Bremerton-Silverdale, WA  84.3 4,304 0.064 
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT  88.5 6,064 0.260 
Bristol, VA  91.4 3,836 0.045 
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX  89.4 4,390 0.079 
Brunswick, GA  64.8 1,836 0.016 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY  93.3 3,212 1.189 
Burlington, NC  76.9 3,020 0.111 
Burlington-South Burlington, VT  81.0 2,314 0.006 
Canton-Massillon, OH  73.8 3,092 0.339 
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL  72.2 3,000 0.269 
Carson City, NV  87.4 3,907 0.005 
Casper, WY  100.0 8,546 0.003 
Cedar Rapids, IA  85.0 3,555 0.097 
Champaign-Urbana, IL  85.7 4,912 0.058 
Charleston, WV  83.7 3,425 0.177 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC  51.5 1,292 0.100 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC  77.7 2,135 0.303 
Charlottesville, VA  83.2 3,605 0.025 
Chattanooga, TN-GA  77.9 2,192 0.165 
Cheyenne, WY  97.9 4,426 0.011 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI  74.4 2,754 0.984 
Chico, CA  61.3 1,976 0.024 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN  78.2 2,259 0.913 
Clarksville, TN-KY  74.0 2,211 0.040 
Cleveland, TN  86.0 3,048 0.043 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH  72.6 2,378 0.973 
Coeur d’Alene, ID  82.6 2,522 0.067 
College Station-Bryan, TX  90.4 4,787 0.006 
Colorado Springs, CO  93.3 5,919 0.173 
Columbia, MO  78.1 2,353 0.013 
Columbia, SC  61.1 1,744 0.167 
Columbus, GA-AL  69.9 1,972 0.061 
Columbus, IN  79.5 3,501 0.014 
Columbus, OH  76.6 2,450 0.752 
Corpus Christi, TX  94.8 3,929 0.236 
Corvallis, OR  69.7 1,954 0.055 
Cumberland, MD-WV  96.9 3,316 0.012 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX  88.2 5,589 1.422 
Dalton, GA  51.9 1,303 0.008 
Danville, IL  93.7 5,397 0.042 
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Table A.3 (continued) 
 
 
MSA Name 
Percentage of 
Enrollment in Top 
Three Firmsa HHIb 
Percentage 
of National 
Enrollment 
Danville, VA  68.7 2,011 0.053 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL  71.9 2,104 0.095 
Dayton, OH  80.8 2,560 0.444 
Decatur, AL  100.0 7,194 0.028 
Decatur, IL  79.4 3,560 0.015 
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL  90.7 4,090 0.458 
Denver-Aurora, CO  92.0 3,919 1.308 
Des Moines, IA  84.6 2,546 0.107 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI  95.8 5,270 1.686 
Dothan, AL  91.6 4,530 0.032 
Dover, DE  82.6 2,428 0.010 
Dubuque, IA  100.0 4,943 0.002 
Duluth, MN-WI  74.2 2,269 0.116 
Durham, NC  75.8 2,318 0.119 
Eau Claire, WI  66.9 1,871 0.074 
El Centro, CA  71.6 2,287 0.006 
El Paso, TX  70.1 1,962 0.295 
Elizabethtown, KY  82.3 3,191 0.022 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN  79.6 2,300 0.050 
Elmira, NY  91.8 4,467 0.038 
Erie, PA  77.9 3,485 0.231 
Eugene-Springfield, OR  70.6 2,157 0.297 
Evansville, IN-KY  73.2 2,760 0.123 
Fairbanks, AK  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Fargo, ND-MN  77.4 2,630 0.033 
Farmington, NM  67.6 1,927 0.003 
Fayetteville, NC  81.8 2,511 0.069 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO  63.5 1,722 0.135 
Flagstaff, AZ  81.1 2,639 0.019 
Flint, MI  94.7 5,522 0.172 
Florence, AL  93.9 6,253 0.028 
Florence, SC  83.0 2,916 0.018 
Fond du Lac, WI  77.9 2,517 0.058 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO  79.4 2,669 0.095 
Fort Smith, AR-OK  54.1 1,395 0.125 
Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin, FL  70.6 1,875 0.014 
Fort Wayne, IN  61.0 1,711 0.231 
Fresno, CA  82.2 3,211 0.311 
Gadsden, AL  95.0 4,328 0.037 
Gainesville, FL  80.0 2,610 0.022 
Gainesville, GA  78.7 2,214 0.043 
Glens Falls, NY  89.6 3,509 0.076 
Goldsboro, NC  91.6 4,032 0.016 
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MSA Name 
Percentage of 
Enrollment in Top 
Three Firmsa HHIb 
Percentage 
of National 
Enrollment 
Grand Forks, ND-MN  74.6 2,238 0.024 
Grand Junction, CO  83.4 3,787 0.028 
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI  86.4 4,188 0.462 
Great Falls, MT  95.2 4,212 0.035 
Greeley, CO 74.1 2,298 0.062 
Green Bay, WI  73.1 2,383 0.160 
Greensboro-High Point, NC  86.5 3,804 0.446 
Greenville, NC  92.7 5,134 0.011 
Greenville, SC  50.0 1,461 0.229 
Gulfport-Biloxi, MS  87.6 2,890 0.029 
Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV  77.6 2,392 0.034 
Hanford-Corcoran, CA  77.0 2,735 0.015 
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA  74.4 2,115 0.363 
Harrisonburg, VA  76.3 2,208 0.029 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT  75.8 2,640 0.357 
Hattiesburg, MS  96.0 5,193 0.017 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC  71.1 2,072 0.115 
Hinesville-Fort Stewart, GA  52.5 1,335 0.006 
Holland-Grand Haven, MI  89.0 3,935 0.189 
Honolulu, HI  86.2 3,412 0.360 
Hot Springs, AR  79.9 2,286 0.029 
Houma-Bayou Cane-Thibodaux, LA  88.1 5,684 0.056 
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX  67.4 1,821 1.457 
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH  73.5 2,293 0.122 
Huntsville, AL  86.3 3,297 0.071 
Idaho Falls, ID  70.7 2,302 0.024 
Indianapolis, IN  51.5 1,345 0.310 
Iowa City, IA  73.2 2,644 0.019 
Ithaca, NY  85.9 3,147 0.014 
Jackson, MI  96.6 7,110 0.076 
Jackson, MS  79.2 2,562 0.136 
Jackson, TN  69.4 1,976 0.012 
Jacksonville, FL  86.4 4,079 0.330 
Jacksonville, NC  86.3 3,375 0.006 
Janesville, WI  82.9 2,755 0.020 
Jefferson City, MO  79.4 2,923 0.020 
Johnson City, TN  90.0 3,612 0.121 
Johnstown, PA  94.1 5,553 0.199 
Jonesboro, AR  65.7 2,176 0.020 
Joplin, MO  83.5 2,678 0.038 
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI  94.9 5,522 0.148 
Kankakee-Bradley, IL  87.2 2,660 0.005 
Kansas City, MO-KS  93.4 4,103 0.708 
Kennewick-Richland-Pasco, WA  83.7 3,510 0.047 
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MSA Name 
Percentage of 
Enrollment in Top 
Three Firmsa HHIb 
Percentage 
of National 
Enrollment 
Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX  68.7 2,093 0.010 
Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA  82.4 3,499 0.279 
Kingston, NY  68.1 2,385 0.042 
Knoxville, TN  96.7 6,512 0.415 
Kokomo, IN  91.1 3,541 0.007 
La Crosse, WI-MN  79.6 4,276 0.091 
Lafayette, IN  93.0 4,404 0.034 
Lafayette, LA  75.5 2,946 0.026 
Lake Charles, LA  63.5 1,575 0.034 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL  62.1 1,634 0.387 
Lancaster, PA  52.1 1,329 0.276 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI  97.5 8,658 0.239 
Laredo, TX  74.0 2,222 0.014 
Las Cruces, NM  80.9 2,573 0.056 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV  95.5 4,730 0.913 
Lawrence, KS  98.0 4,348 0.008 
Lawton, OK  95.1 5,763 0.013 
Lebanon, PA  69.6 2,404 0.085 
Lewiston, ID-WA  94.7 4,258 0.032 
Lewiston-Auburn, ME  84.7 2,921 0.024 
Lexington-Fayette, KY  85.3 5,009 0.131 
Lima, OH  86.2 3,109 0.027 
Lincoln, NE  76.3 2,234 0.036 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR  67.5 1,672 0.110 
Logan, UT-ID  70.1 1,940 0.044 
Longview, TX  59.6 1,510 0.048 
Longview-Kelso, WA  94.5 4,603 0.085 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA  70.2 2,031 6.276 
Louisville, KY-IN  76.5 2,207 0.411 
Lubbock, TX  81.3 2,415 0.041 
Lynchburg, VA  70.6 2,071 0.083 
Macon, GA  59.9 1,561 0.067 
Madera, CA  85.0 4,376 0.064 
Madison, WI  68.4 1,955 0.068 
Manchester-Nashua, NH  81.3 3,315 0.051 
Mansfield, OH  84.6 2,852 0.029 
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr, TX  88.6 2,998 0.076 
Medford, OR  90.0 4,048 0.131 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR  67.8 1,791 0.282 
Merced, CA  62.1 1,694 0.016 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL  68.6 3,105 4.073 
Michigan City-La Porte, IN  79.1 2,449 0.011 
Midland, TX  67.7 1,953 0.014 
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MSA Name 
Percentage of 
Enrollment in Top 
Three Firmsa HHIb 
Percentage 
of National 
Enrollment 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI  81.5 2,889 0.613 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI  75.6 2,723 1.276 
Missoula, MT  93.6 3,488 0.031 
Mobile, AL  98.0 3,406 0.268 
Modesto, CA  93.7 4,622 0.282 
Monroe, LA  81.7 2,827 0.032 
Monroe, MI  85.6 3,724 0.055 
Montgomery, AL  82.3 2,503 0.183 
Morgantown, WV  95.8 6,888 0.035 
Morristown, TN  98.4 4,429 0.078 
Mount Vernon-Anacortes, WA  87.9 3,386 0.059 
Muncie, IN  69.2 2,043 0.017 
Muskegon-Norton Shores, MI  85.5 3,603 0.105 
Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, SC  56.8 1,344 0.053 
Napa, CA  95.9 7,615 0.086 
Naples-Marco Island, FL  69.5 1,999 0.065 
Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro, TN  87.1 5,136 0.617 
New Haven-Milford, CT  85.0 4,167 0.300 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA  99.3 4,849 0.783 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA  59.5 1,577 6.364 
Niles-Benton Harbor, MI  97.4 6,354 0.062 
Norwich-New London, CT  94.4 5,127 0.042 
Ocala, FL  68.9 2,003 0.221 
Ocean City, NJ  91.2 4,895 0.026 
Odessa, TX  78.1 2,353 0.014 
Ogden-Clearfield, UT  70.5 1,828 0.172 
Oklahoma City, OK  88.1 3,244 0.422 
Olympia, WA  80.2 3,224 0.127 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA  86.6 4,266 0.198 
Orlando, FL  79.3 2,590 0.783 
Oshkosh-Neenah, WI  81.4 2,939 0.112 
Owensboro, KY  93.8 5,528 0.021 
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA  84.3 2,892 0.302 
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL  89.3 5,090 0.366 
Panama City-Lynn Haven, FL  77.3 2,544 0.015 
Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH  88.6 3,649 0.048 
Pascagoula, MS  72.4 2,213 0.026 
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL  80.7 2,839 0.141 
Peoria, IL  79.7 4,400 0.118 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE  88.3 3,340 3.252 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ  67.3 1,961 2.473 
Pine Bluff, AR  82.6 3,189 0.030 
Pittsburgh, PA  90.3 3,846 3.185 
Pittsfield, MA  62.5 1,755 0.002 
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Table A.3 (continued) 
 
 
MSA Name 
Percentage of 
Enrollment in Top 
Three Firmsa HHIb 
Percentage 
of National 
Enrollment 
Pocatello, ID  79.1 2,207 0.035 
Port St. Lucie-Fort Pierce, FL  72.0 2,227 0.195 
Portland-South Portland, ME  57.9 1,530 0.105 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA  64.5 1,802 1.596 
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY  61.7 1,588 0.086 
Prescott, AZ  73.0 2,236 0.115 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA  88.7 3,701 0.875 
Provo-Orem, UT  74.1 1,961 0.152 
Pueblo, CO  93.0 6,550 0.065 
Punta Gorda, FL  80.1 2,958 0.100 
Racine, WI  82.0 2,433 0.078 
Raleigh-Cary, NC  79.8 2,704 0.208 
Rapid City, SD  86.7 3,630 0.025 
Reading, PA  63.4 1,854 0.239 
Redding, CA  63.8 1,765 0.029 
Reno-Sparks, NV  91.2 3,911 0.152 
Richmond, VA  65.5 2,194 0.268 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA  67.3 1,820 2.422 
Roanoke, VA  66.4 1,833 0.090 
Rochester, MN  79.7 2,380 0.061 
Rochester, NY  96.6 5,388 1.076 
Rockford, IL  85.9 2,824 0.133 
Rocky Mount, NC  94.1 4,910 0.019 
Rome, GA  70.1 1,981 0.012 
Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville, CA  91.3 4,337 1.344 
Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI  93.5 7,132 0.068 
Salem, OR  66.0 1,917 0.365 
Salinas, CA  82.3 2,981 0.013 
Salisbury, MD  100.0 10,000 0.001 
Salt Lake City, UT  71.6 1,889 0.387 
San Angelo, TX  74.2 2,737 0.011 
San Antonio, TX  90.2 4,066 0.848 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA  89.7 3,568 1.717 
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA  89.8 5,026 2.572 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA  89.7 4,832 0.859 
San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles, CA  93.2 4,617 0.061 
Sandusky, OH  86.2 3,186 0.018 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA  84.2 3,100 0.137 
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA  85.3 3,813 0.057 
Santa Fe, NM  83.6 4,547 0.056 
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA  96.4 7,641 0.285 
Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL  67.2 1,697 0.329 
Savannah, GA  55.5 1,442 0.077 
31
Table A.3 (continued) 
 
MSA Name 
Percentage of 
Enrollment in Top 
Three Firmsa HHIb 
Percentage 
of National 
Enrollment 
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA  73.6 2,392 0.307 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA  82.4 2,590 1.174 
Sheboygan, WI  79.1 2,490 0.058 
Sherman-Denison, TX  68.1 2,614 0.014 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA  89.4 5,032 0.097 
Sioux City, IA-NE-SD  83.8 3,172 0.050 
Sioux Falls, SD  81.6 4,206 0.027 
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI  61.6 1,645 0.109 
Spartanburg, SC  48.4 1,220 0.140 
Spokane, WA  70.7 1,899 0.165 
Springfield, IL  76.8 3,114 0.020 
Springfield, MA  88.4 3,690 0.241 
Springfield, MO  77.4 2,177 0.275 
Springfield, OH  88.7 3,435 0.102 
St. Cloud, MN  61.6 1,807 0.075 
St. George, UT  79.3 3,003 0.070 
St. Joseph, MO-KS  89.8 4,110 0.010 
St. Louis, MO-IL  80.6 2,484 1.237 
State College, PA  83.3 3,139 0.089 
Stockton, CA  80.5 3,820 0.256 
Sumter, SC  78.8 2,239 0.027 
Syracuse, NY  71.7 1,985 0.218 
Tallahassee, FL  88.6 5,410 0.143 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL  78.8 2,481 2.144 
Terre Haute, IN  92.9 3,519 0.011 
Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR  74.3 2,468 0.027 
Toledo, OH  84.6 3,521 0.294 
Topeka, KS  92.5 3,993 0.012 
Trenton-Ewing, NJ  96.7 3,515 0.071 
Tucson, AZ  92.1 4,326 0.764 
Tulsa, OK  80.9 4,095 0.486 
Tuscaloosa, AL  96.1 5,323 0.055 
Tyler, TX  56.2 1,395 0.038 
Utica-Rome, NY  82.6 2,911 0.141 
Valdosta, GA  73.9 2,063 0.009 
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA  92.4 6,355 0.238 
Vero Beach, FL  61.2 1,734 0.044 
Victoria, TX  87.0 4,294 0.010 
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ  99.2 5,169 0.031 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC  69.9 2,481 0.283 
Visalia-Porterville, CA  71.0 2,019 0.060 
Waco, TX  76.1 2,287 0.036 
Warner Robins, GA  62.9 1,930 0.012 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD  68.8 2,476 0.387 
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MSA Name 
Percentage of 
Enrollment in Top 
Three Firmsa HHIb 
Percentage 
of National 
Enrollment 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA  90.9 3,650 0.042 
Wausau, WI  91.9 4,700 0.082 
Weirton-Steubenville, WV-OH  77.4 2,753 0.092 
Wenatchee, WA  88.2 3,943 0.033 
Wheeling, WV-OH  86.0 3,866 0.136 
Wichita Falls, TX  74.9 2,150 0.007 
Wichita, KS  97.5 4,177 0.118 
Williamsport, PA  58.0 1,576 0.068 
Wilmington, NC  82.6 3,984 0.062 
Winchester, VA-WV  77.6 2,225 0.020 
Winston-Salem, NC  94.2 4,267 0.386 
Worcester, MA  91.8 4,442 0.499 
Yakima, WA  57.0 1,646 0.059 
York-Hanover, PA  62.7 1,612 0.210 
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA  70.4 2,258 0.452 
Yuba City-Marysville, CA  71.7 2,389 0.016 
Yuma, AZ  78.6 3,884 0.044 
 
Source: MPR analysis of CMS data on enrollment by contract-plan-county, March 2009. 
 
Note: Includes enrollments all MA plans in the group and individual market (including SNPs). 
 
n.a. = not applicable / no MA. 
 
aThe three firms chosen have the highest market share in that MSA and are not necessarily the same across 
markets. 
 
bHHI is the standard index used in federal antitrust work. It is constructed by adding the squares of the market share 
of individual firms to assess the level of market concentration. Markets with an HHI above 1,800 are viewed as highly 
concentrated and subject to increased scouting. The maximum HHI is 10,000. 
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Table A.4. Percentage of Beneficiaries by Number of MA Contracts Available by Type, 2009 
(excludes group-only contracts) 
 Percentage of Beneficiaries 
Number of 
Contracts Offered 
Any 
Private 
Plan 
Contract 
Any MA 
Contract 
Any MA 
Except 
SNP-
Only HMO 
Local 
PPO or 
POSa PFFS 
RPPO
a   MSA 
0 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 17.6% 31.2% 0.2% 9.1% 31.9%
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.4 21.9 1.0 74.1 64.3 
2 0.0 0.1 0.2 11.0 16.1 2.0 16.8 3.9 
3 0.1 0.1 0.0 14.0 13.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 
4 0.1 0.2 0.2 10.3 10.7 7.5 0.0 0.0 
5 0.4 0.6 1.0 7.3 4.5 5.9 0.0 0.0 
6 0.9 1.3 1.5 6.3 1.6 3.5 0.0 0.0 
7 1.2 1.6 2.1 3.4 0.7 6.1 0.0 0.0 
8 1.5 1.8 2.3 2.3 0.4 14.7 0.0 0.0 
9 2.6 3.0 4.5 1.1 0.0 14.8 0.0 0.0 
10 3.5 4.8 5.5 0.9 0.0 13.5 0.0 0.0 
11-15 29.7 29.9 31.5 6.8 0.0 26.2 0.0 0.0 
16-20 21.6 21.5 22.7 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Over 20 38.1 35.0 28.4 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Source:  MPR analysis of CMS’s Contract-County enrollment file. 
 
aExcludes contracts of this type with SNP plans only. PFFS and MSAs cannot offer SNPs. 
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Table A.5. CMS’s Standardized Plan Type Terminology for Active HPMS Plans 
Plan Type  
Plan Name with Standardized  
Plan Type Label Note on Availability/Authority 
HMO  Plan name (HMO)   
PPO  Plan name (PPO)   
HMO-POS  Plan name (HMO-POS)   
ESRD II  Plan name (HMO-POS)  Specialized 
PSO  Plan name (PSO)   
MSA  Plan name (MSA)   
MSA demo  Plan name (MSA)   
RFB PFFS Plan name (PFFS)  Specialized 
PFFS  Plan name (PFFS)   
1876 cost Plan name (cost)  Authorized separately from MA 
1833 cost Plan name (cost)  Authorized separately from MA 
PACE Plan name (PACE)  Authorized separately from MA 
PDP Plan name (PDP)  Part D only 
Regional PPO  Plan name (regional PPO)   
Employer PDP Plan name (employer PDP)  Specialized, Part D only 
Employer PFFS Plan name (employer PFFS)  Specialized 
RFB HMO Plan name (HMO)  Specialized 
RFB HMO-POS  Plan name (HMO-POS)  Specialized 
RFB local PPO Plan name (PPO)  Specialized 
RFB PSO Plan name (PSO)  Specialized 
CCRC Plan name (HMO-POS)  Specialized 
 
Source: CMS 2010 call letter, exhibit on pp. 90-91 (annotation added by MPR). 
 
Note: HPMS refers to CMS’s Health Plan Management System; RFB refers to religious fraternal benefit plans. 
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Table A.6. Percentage of Beneficiaries by Number of MA Plans Available by Type  
 Percentage of Beneficiaries 
Number of Plans 
Offered in 
County  
Any 
Private 
Plan  
Any MA 
Contract 
Any MA 
Except 
SNP-
Only HMO 
Local 
PPO or 
POS PFFS RPPO   MSA 
All MA Plans 
0 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 17.9% 31.8% 0.2% 9.1% 31.9% 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 6.5 0.0 19.3 64.3 
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 13.0 0.0 41.1 3.9 
3-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.8 24.5 2.4 30.5 0.0 
6-10 0.3 0.3 0.3 18.3 18.7 5.0 0.0 0.0 
11-15 0.3 0.7 0.9 13.3 4.5 9.5 0.0 0.0 
16-19 1.4 1.7 2.7 8.4 0.9 10.5 0.0 0.0 
20-29 8.8 10.6 13.4 10.1 0.2 39.6 0.0 0.0 
30-39 16.6 19.8 28.4 5.2 0.0 27.1 0.0 0.0 
40-49 24.3 22.7 24.9 3.6 0.0 5.5 0.0 0.0 
50-59 14.8 13.6 13.6 2.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
60-69 12.4 14.1 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
70+ 20.9 16.3 8.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
MA-PD Plans Only 
0 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 17.9% 31.8% 0.2% 9.1% 100.0% 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 7.3 0.0 57.6 0.0 
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 15.0 2.7 25.6 0.0 
3-5 0.3 0.3 0.3 19.3 29.9 4.0 7.8 0.0 
6-10 1.9 2.5 2.5 18.7 14.6 21.8 0.0 0.0 
11-15 11.2 14.5 14.5 15.4 1.8 45.3 0.0 0.0 
16-19 15.4 17.0 17.0 6.0 0.2 20.3 0.0 0.0 
20-29 36.6 33.6 33.6 6.6 0.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 
30-39 22.3 20.4 20.4 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
40-49 5.8 5.4 5.4 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
50-59 5.1 4.8 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
60-69 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
70+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A.6 (continued) 
 
 
 Percentage of Beneficiaries 
Number of Plans 
Offered in 
County  
Any 
Private 
Plan  
Any MA 
Contract 
Any MA 
Except 
SNP-
Only HMO 
Local 
PPO or 
POS PFFS RPPO   MSA 
MA-Only Plans 
0 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 25.8% 61.8% 0.2% 31.2% 31.9% 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.3 23.7 1.4 61.7 64.3 
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.6 8.4 2.4 7.1 3.9 
3-5 0.5 0.8 1.1 24.9 4.1 5.4 0.0 0.0 
6-10 3.6 3.9 11.5 11.4 0.1 26.9 0.0 0.0 
11-15 10.3 14.1 26.3 4.9 0.0 35.0 0.0 0.0 
16-19 14.8 14.3 22.6 0.0 0.0 18.9 0.0 0.0 
20-29 36.0 36.0 36.3 0.0 0.0 9.7 0.0 0.0 
30-39 23.3 19.5 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
40-49 5.3 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
50-59 4.3 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
60-69 1.7 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
70+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Source: MPR analysis of CMS’s Contract-Plan-County enrollment file. 
 
Note: Plans exclude group and SNPs. 
 
37
 
 
Table A.7. Number of MA Plans by Enrollment Size and Type, United States, March 2009 (excludes 
SNPs and group plans) 
Contract Enrollment Category 
Number of 
Plans 
Percentage of 
Plans 
Number of 
Plans 
Percentage of 
Plans 
All MA Plans 
All  2,735 100.0% 7,106,356 100.0% 
None (or 10 or fewer) 461 16.9 0 0.0 
11–99 462 16.9 21,046 0.3 
100–499  579 21.2 149,264 2.1 
500–999  285 10.4 202,954 2.9 
1,000–1,499  189 6.9 233,781 3.3 
1,500–1,999  121 4.4 207,821 2.9 
2,000–2,499  84 3.1 190,368 2.7 
2,500–2,999  63 2.3 174,466 2.5 
3,000–4,999  156 5.7 608,001 8.6 
5,000–9,999  138 5.0 972,781 13.7 
10,000 or more  197 7.2 4,345,874 61.2 
HMO Plans 
All  1,449 100.0 4,601,879 100.0 
None (or 10 or fewer) 171 11.8 0 0.0 
11–99 240 16.6 10,700 0.2 
100–499  312 21.5 79,538 1.7 
500–999  159 11.0 113,873 2.5 
1,000–1,499  105 7.2 129,823 2.8 
1,500–1,999  69 4.8 119,314 2.6 
2,000–2,499  40 2.8 90,140 2.0 
2,500–2,999  37 2.6 102,321 2.2 
3,000–4,999  91 6.3 356,069 7.7 
5,000–9,999  91 6.3 624,023 13.6 
10,000 or more  134 9.2 2,976,078 64.7 
Local PPO Plans 
All  532 100.0 690,046 100.0 
None (or 10 or fewer) 95 17.9 0 0.0 
11–99 98 18.4 4,550 0.7 
100–499  118 22.2 32,364 4.7 
500–999  69 13.0 48,224 7.0 
1,000–1,499  33 6.2 41,665 6.0 
1,500–1,999  25 4.7 42,233 6.1 
2,000–2,499  28 5.3 63,358 9.2 
2,500–2,999  14 2.6 38,166 5.5 
3,000–4,999  22 4.1 83,441 12.1 
5,000–9,999  18 3.4 137,280 19.9 
10,000 or more  12 2.3 198,765 28.8 
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Table A.7 (continued) 
 
 
Contract Enrollment Category 
Number of 
Plans 
Percentage of 
Plans 
Number of 
Plans 
Percentage of 
Plans 
Regional PPO Plans 
All  51 100.0 291,643 100.0 
None (or 10 or fewer) 2 3.9 0 0.0 
11–99 2 3.9 34 0.0 
100–499  10 19.7 2,238 0.8 
500–999  5 9.8 3,236 1.1 
1,000–1,499  4 7.8 5,337 1.8 
1,500–1,999  3 5.9 4,665 1.6 
2,000–2,499  2 3.9 4,486 1.5 
2,500–2,999  2 3.9 5,935 2.0 
3,000–4,999  9 17.6 34,271 11.8 
5,000–9,999  3 5.9 25,657 8.8 
10,000 or more  9 17.6 205,784 70.6 
PFFS Plans 
All  696 100.0 1,521,083 100.0 
None (or 10 or fewer) 190 27.3 0 0.0 
11–99 121 17.4 5,732 0.4 
100–499  137 19.7 34,371 2.3 
500–999  51 7.3 36,699 2.4 
1,000–1,499  47 6.8 56,956 3.7 
1,500–1,999  24 3.4 41,609 2.7 
2,000–2,499  14 2.0 32,384 2.1 
2,500–2,999  10 1.4 28,044 1.8 
3,000–4,999  34 4.9 134,220 8.8 
5,000–9,999  26 3.7 185,821 12.2 
10,000 or more  42 6.0 965,247 63.5 
MSA Plans 
All  7 100.0 1,705 100.0 
None (or 10 or fewer) 3 42.9 0 0.0 
11–99 1 14.3 30 1.8 
100–499  2 28.6 753 44.2 
500–999  1 14.3 922 54.1 
1,000–1,499  0 0.0 0 0.0 
1,500–1,999  0 0.0 0 0.0 
2,000–2,499  0 0.0 0 0.0 
2,500–2,999  0 0.0 0 0.0 
3,000–4,999  0 0.0 0 0.0 
5,000–9,999  0 0.0 0 0.0 
10,000 or more  0 0.0 0 0.0 
  
Source: MPR analysis of CMS’s Contract-County-Enrollment file for March 2009. 
 
Note: Contracts are for MA contracts only (excluding cost, HCPP, PACE, and demonstration contracts). With MA, 
the count excludes group-only and SNP-only contracts. Total enrollment includes all plans offered in 
contracts (including SNP and group plans of that type). 
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Table A.8. Number of MA Plans by Enrollment Size and Whether Part D Coverage Is Included, 
United States, March 2009 (excludes SNPs and group plans) 
Plan Type and Enrollment Category Number of Plans
Percentage of 
Plans 
Number of 
Enrollees 
Percentage of 
Enrollees 
All MA Plans 
All  2,735 100.0% 7,106,356 100.0% 
None (or 10 or fewer) 461 16.9 0 0.0 
11–99 462 16.9 21,046 0.3 
100–499  579 21.2 149,264 2.1 
500–999  285 10.4 202,954 2.9 
1,000–1,499  189 6.9 233,781 3.3 
1,500–1,999  121 4.4 207,821 2.9 
2,000–2,499  84 3.1 190,368 2.7 
2,500–2,999  63 2.3 174,466 2.5 
3,000–4,999  156 5.7 608,001 8.6 
5,000–9,999  138 5.0 972,781 13.7 
10,000 or more  197 7.2 4,345,874 61.2 
MA-PD Plans 
All  2,035 100.0 6,266,595 100.0 
None (or 10 or fewer) 1,254 12.5 0 0.0 
11–99 312 15.3 14,114 0.2 
100–499  413 20.3 108,457 1.7 
500–999  227 11.2 159,949 2.5 
1,000–1,499  162 8.0 200,578 3.2 
1,500–1,999  105 5.2 180,800 2.9 
2,000–2,499  67 3.3 152,072 2.4 
2,500–2,999  48 2.4 131,979 2.1 
3,000–4,999  143 7.0 555,606 8.9 
5,000–9,999  127 6.2 893,732 14.3 
10,000 or more  177 8.7 3,869,308 61.7 
MA-Only Plans 
All  700 100.0 839,761 100.0 
None (or 10 or fewer) 207 29.6 0 0.0 
11–99 150 21.4 6,932 0.8 
100–499  166 23.7 40,807 4.9 
500–999  58 8.3 43,005 5.1 
1,000–1,499  27 3.9 33,203 4.0 
1,500–1,999  16 2.3 27,021 3.2 
2,000–2,499  17 2.4 38,296 4.6 
2,500–2,999  15 2.1 42,487 5.1 
3,000–4,999  13 1.9 52,395 6.2 
5,000–9,999  11 1.6 79,049 9.4 
10,000 or more  20 2.9 476,566 56.8 
 
Source: MPR’s analysis of CMS’s Contract-County-Plan enrollment file for March 2009. 
 
Note: Includes MA plans only (excluding cost, HCPP, PACE, and demonstration plans). Group plans and SNPs 
are excluded. 
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Table A.9. Number of MA Contracts and Enrollees by Size of Contract Enrollment, United States, 
March 2009 
Contract Enrollment Category 
Number of 
Contracts 
Percentage of 
Contracts 
Number of 
Enrollees 
Percentage of 
Enrollees 
All MA Contracts 
All  538 100.0% 9,882,425 100.0% 
None (or 10 or fewer) 27 5.0 0 0.0 
11–99 26 4.8 1,275 0.0 
100–499  53 9.9 14,711 0.1 
500–999  43 8.0 31,733 0.3 
1,000–1,499  40 7.4 49,478 0.5 
1,500–1,999  23 4.3 39,552 0.4 
2,000–2,499  23 4.3 51,968 0.5 
2,500–2,999  21 3.9 56,989 0.6 
3,000–4,999  54 10.0 212,870 2.2 
5,000–9,999  50 9.3 361,693 3.7 
10,000 or more  178 33.1 9,062,156 91.7 
HMO Contracts 
All  298 100.0 6,409,504 100.0 
None (or 10 or fewer) 5 1.4 0 0.0 
11–99 10 3.4 503 0.0 
100–499  21 7.0 5,527 0.1 
500–999  19 6.4 14,390 0.2 
1,000–1,499  19 6.4 23,194 0.4 
1,500–1,999  13 4.4 22,586 0.4 
2,000–2,499  12 4.0 27,618 0.4 
2,500–2,999  12 4.0 32,613 0.5 
3,000–4,999  31 10.4 124,125 1.9 
5,000–9,999  30 10.1 215,110 3.4 
10,000 or more  126 42.3 5,943,838 92.7 
Local PPO Contracts 
All  157 100.0 834,726 100.0 
None (or 10 or fewer) 13 8.3 0 0.0 
11–99 10 6.4 503 0.1 
100–499  24 15.3 6,864 0.8 
500–999  20 12.7 14,443 1.7 
1,000–1,499  14 8.9 17,522 2.1 
1,500–1,999  6 3.8 10,508 1.3 
2,000–2,499  7 4.5 15,263 1.8 
2,500–2,999  5 3.2 13,586 1.6 
3,000–4,999  18 11.5 68,522 8.2 
5,000–9,999  14 8.9 102,640 12.3 
10,000 or more  26 16.6 584,875 70.1 
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Table A.9 (continued) 
 
Contract Enrollment Category 
Number of 
Contracts 
Percentage of 
Contracts 
Number of 
Enrollees 
Percentage of 
Enrollees 
Regional PPO Contracts 
All  11 100.0 328,109 100.0 
None (or 10 or fewer) 0 0.0 0 0.0 
11–99 0 0.0 0 0.0 
100–499  0 0.0 0 0.0 
500–999  0 0.0 0 0.0 
1,000–1,499  1 9.1 1,480 0.5 
1,500–1,999  0 0.0 0 0.0 
2,000–2,499  2 18.2 4,540 1.4 
2,500–2,999  0 0.0 0 0.0 
3,000–4,999  2 18.2 7,237 2.2 
5,000–9,999  0 0.0 0 0.0 
10,000 or more  6 54.5 314,852 96.0 
PFFS Contracts 
All  70 100.0 2,308,220 100.0 
None (or 10 or fewer) 9 12.9 0 0.0 
11–99 6 8.6 269 0.0 
100–499  7 10.0 1,980 0.1 
500–999  4 5.7 2,900 0.1 
1,000–1,499  6 8.6 7,282 0.3 
1,500–1,999  3 4.3 4,932 0.2 
2,000–2,499  2 2.9 4,547 0.2 
2,500–2,999  4 5.7 10,790 0.5 
3,000–4,999  3 4.3 12,986 0.6 
5,000–9,999  6 8.6 43,943 1.9 
10,000 or more  20 28.6 2,218,591 96.1 
MSA Contracts 
All  2 100.0 1,866 100.0 
None (or 10 or fewer) 0 0.0 0 0.0 
11–99 0 0.0 0 0.0 
100–499  1 50.0 340 18.2 
500–999  0 0.0 0 0.0 
1,000–1,499  0 0.0 0 0.0 
1,500–1,999  1 50.0 1,526 81.8 
2,000–2,499  0 0.0 0 0.0 
2,500–2,999  0 0.0 0 0.0 
3,000–4,999  0 0.0 0 0.0 
5,000–9,999  0 0.0 0 0.0 
10,000 or more  0 0.0 0 0.0 
 
Source: MPR analysis of CMS’s Contract-County-Enrollment file for March 2009. 
 
Note: Contracts are for MA contracts only (excluding cost, HCPP, PACE, and demonstration contracts). With MA, 
the count excludes group-only and SNP-only contracts. Total enrollment includes all plans offered in 
contracts (including SNP and group plans of that type). 
42
 
Table A.10. Firms with the Most PFFS Enrollees, 2009 (individual enrollment only) 
 
Number of Enrollees 
Percentage of 
PFFS Enrollees 
Percentage of Firm’s 
Total MA Enrollment 
Humana 492,209 32.4% 37.1% 
Coventry 190,249 12.5 55.4 
UnitedHealthcare 152,532 10.0 10.0 
Universal American 139,819 9.2 70.6 
WellPoint 123,578 8.1 32.9 
WellCare 97,382 6.4 38.8 
Sterling (Munich American) 83,991 5.5 99.7 
Aetna  26,929 1.8 15.9 
Health Net 11,939 0.8 5.3 
Blue Cross Blue Shield affiliates 
(other than WellPoint) 
 
140,666 
 
9.2 
 
12.5 
 
Other 61,821 4.1 2.8 
All 1,521,115   100% 17.7% 
 
Source:  MPR analysis of CMS’s Contract-County file for March 2009. 
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